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Eco and Peirce on Abduction
Francesco Bellucci
1 One of the key concepts that Eco took from Peirce is that of “abduction,” or reasoning to
an explanatory hypothesis.  This concept is central  to his foundation of a semiotic or
interpretative semantics, one of whose component is a theory of inference, and especially
of abductive inference.  Though there is  probably only one “official” place where Eco
expounds his theory of abductive reasoning – the article “Horns, Hooves, and Insteps” in
The Sign of Three – yet Eco’s theory is spanned over tens of papers and books, including his
fictional books. 
2 Eco’s  fictional  books  have  often  been  considered  as,  to  say  the  least,  “profoundly
connected” with his scholarly work. But Paolucci has persuasively argued that not only
Eco’s philosophical work influenced his fictional work, but also, and more crucially, that
his fictional works are an integral part of his philosophy: “[t]he union of the theoretical
and  nontheoretical  works  constitute  Eco’s  philosophical legacy,  his  ‘philosophy’.”
(Paolucci 2017a: 254).  Moving from this assumption, this paper seeks to explore Eco’s
philosophy of abduction moving from both his theoretical and his non-theoretical works,
these two sides forming in fact an inextricable unity.
3 The  Name  of  the  Rose contains  one  of  the  best  and  most  detailed  accounts  of  Eco’s
philosophy of  abductive reasoning.  Among the several  abductions that  the two main
characters, William of Baskerville and Adso of Melk, perform in the course of the story,
the abduction concerning the horse Brunellus in the overture of the book is certainly the
most remarkable, if only because it is commented at length in the sequel of the book. The
model of the Brunellus episode is to be found in the third chapter of Voltaire’s Zadig, in
which Zadig abduces some of the features of the king’s horse that the royal officials are
seeking.1 The Zadig episode is analyzed by Eco in “Horns,” where a typology of abductions
is presented. 
4 Eco took his notion of abductive inference from Peirce. Peirce’s mature (i.e., post-1900)
theory of abduction comprises both an analysis  of  the abductive process of reasoning
within the larger horizon of scientific inquiry, and a philosophical justification of this kind
of reasoning. Both these aspects are present in Eco’s theory of abduction, and both are
represented in the analysis of the Zadig episode offered in “Horns.” However,  I  shall
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argue,  a “more Peircean” analysis of abductive reasoning than that given in “Horns”
about Zadig is contained in the Brunellus episode in The Name of the Rose, because there
Eco reproduces more accurately than he does with Zadig the Peircean model of scientific
inquiry. As I will try to show, while Zadig’s horse abduction seems to be fashioned on
Peirce’s early analysis of abduction (the data are signs, and particularly indices that form
an icon, of the conclusion), William’s course of reasoning is more akin to Peirce’s mature
analysis of abduction (a hypothesis is suggested by abduction from data as signs, and is
subsequently explicated by deduction and verified by induction). The overture of Eco’s
most famous novel  is  consequently a crucial  component of  Eco’s  theory of  abductive
reasoning. Also, I will argue that, like Peirce, Eco solved the problem of the justification of
abduction through the idea that this justification is itself abductive (meta-abduction in
Eco, ur-abduction in Peirce).
5 The paper is organized as follows. The first section expounds the essentials of Peirce’s
theory of abduction, and explains how Peirce moved from seeing abduction as a kind of
reasoning (in his earliest writings) to seeing it as a stage of the larger process of inquiry
(in his mature writings).  The second section deals with the Brunellus abduction,  and
shows that, just like in Peirce’s three-stages model of inquiry, William’s abductions are
explicated  by  deduction  and  verified  by  induction.  The  third  section  examines  the
problem of the justification of abductive reasoning (especially,  but not exclusively, as
discussed in “Horns”).
 
1. A Sketch of Abductive Logic 
6 In his earliest writings on the three forms of inference (1865-1867) Peirce had explained
abduction (at that time called “hypothesis”) as an argument in which the premises are an
icon of the conclusion. More precisely, abduction is the transformation of a conjunctive
term (which, like an icon, has connotation but lacks appropriate denotation, W1: 279) into
a symbol on the principle that “the symbol which embodies any form [conjunctive term]
is predicable of the same subjects as the form itself” (W1: 188), or in other words that any
symbol that possesses any character also possessed by an object is itself a symbol of the object. As
he explains in the 1867 “Classification” (interpolation in brackets mine): abduction is “an
argument  which  assumes  that  a  term  [symbol]  which  necessarily  involves  a  certain
number of characters [conjunctive term, icon] […] may be predicated of any object [object]
which  has  all  these  characters”  (W2:  48).  The  substance  of  this  doctrine,  variously
rephrased, can be found in the “New List” (1867, W2: 58), in “Some Consequences of Four
Incapacities” (1868, W2: 217-8), and in “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis” (1878, W3:
326-7). The maturest version of this early theory is in the article “A Theory of Probable
Inference” in the volume of Studies in Logic edited by Peirce himself in 1883, where Peirce
explains  induction  and  abduction  as  inversions  of  a  valid  deductive  syllogism  (W4:
416-23).2
7 Later in his life Peirce came to see that his early view of abduction was incorrect. In July
1910 he writes to Paul Carus that “the division of the elementary kinds of reasoning into
three heads was made by me in my first lectures and was published in 1869 in Harris’s
Journal of Speculative Philosophy. I still consider that it had a sound basis. Only in almost
everything I printed before the beginning of this century […] I more or less mixed up
Hypothesis and Induction.” (RL 77: 226-7 = CP 8.227). In the sketch of logical critics given
in the Minute Logic Peirce says:
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Upon this subject [i.e. abduction], my doctrine has been immensely improved since
my essay “On The Theory of Probable Inference” was published in 1883. In what I
there said about “Hypothetic Inference” I was an explorer upon untrodden ground.
I committed, though I half corrected, a slight positive error, which is easily set right
without essentially altering my position. But my capital error was a negative one, in
not perceiving that, according to my own principles, the reasoning with which I
was  there  dealing  could  not  be  the  reasoning  by  which  we  are  led  to  adopt  a
hypothesis,  although I  all  but  stated as  much.  But  I  was  too much taken up in
considering  syllogistic  forms  and  the  doctrine  of  logical  extension  and
comprehension, both of which I made more fundamental than they really are. As
long as I held that opinion, my conceptions of Abduction necessarily confused two
different kinds of reasoning. (CP 2.102)
8 The two different kinds of reasoning that Peirce had conflated under the conception of
abduction are abduction proper,  which he now describes as the process of  forming an
explanatory hypothesis, and qualitative induction, which is an induction about characters.
He now realizes that what he used to call “hypothesis” and “abduction” in his earlier
writings has not a substantially different leading principle from induction: an abduction in the
sense of 1865-1883 is, at bottom, an induction about characters rather than about things.
Instead  of  reasoning  about  things  in  extension  (enumerative  terms,  indices),  as  in
induction,  we  reason  about  characters  in  comprehension  (conjunctive  terms,  icons):
instead of saying that the characters possessed by the sample are possessed by the whole,
we say that something which possesses a sample of the characters of a thing possesses all
the characters of that thing (i.e., is that thing whose characters it possesses). This second
form of reasoning is properly called abductive or qualitative induction. Its leading principle
is inductive, however, not abductive. So in the second Cambridge Conference of 1898 on
“Types  of  Reasoning” Peirce  declares:  “I  first  gave this  theory in 1867,  improving it
slightly in 1868. In 1878 I gave a popular account of it in which I rightly insisted upon the
radical  distinction  between  Induction  and  Retroduction.  In  1883,  I  made  a  careful
restatement  with considerable  improvement.  But  I  was  led astray by trusting to  the
perfect balance of logical breadth and depth into the mistake of treating Retroduction as
a kind of Induction.” (R 441: 29-30). Both induction proper and the 1865-1883 form of
reasoning called abduction are inferences from the sample to the whole. In the one the
sample is taken in extension, in the other in comprehension. But all inference from the
sample to the whole is essentially inductive. Abduction proper, also called “retroduction,”
is not an inference from the sample to the whole; it is, rather, the process of reasoning by
which we form an explanatory hypothesis.
9 The fundamental change in Peirce’s conception of abduction occurs in the decade that
precedes the Minute Logic.3 In the 1901 article “On the Logic of Drawing History from
Ancient Documents” (R 690 = EP2: 75-114) Peirce presents a view of the articulation of
scientific discovery in which the three kinds of arguments occur as distinct stages of a
typical  scientific  investigation.  The  first  stage  of  inquiry  is  abduction.  When we are
confronted with facts contrary to our expectations,  an explanation is called for:  “the
explanation must be such a proposition as would lead to the prediction of the observed
facts,  either  as  necessary  consequences  or  at  least  as  very  probable  under  the
circumstances. A hypothesis, then, has to be adopted, which is likely in itself, and renders
the facts likely. This step of adopting a hypothesis as being suggested by the facts, is what
I call abduction. I reckon it as a form of inference, however problematical the hypothesis
may be held.” (EP2: 94-5). The “classic” formulation of the logical form of abduction is in
the seventh and last Harvard Lecture of 1903:
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The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (EP2: 231 = CP 5.189) 
10 The second step of inquiry is to trace necessary, or deductive, consequences from the
hypothesis: “the first thing that will be done, as soon as a hypothesis has been adopted,
will be to trace out its necessary and probable experiential consequences. This step is
deduction.”  (EP2:  95).  By abduction we form the hypothesis  that  “there is  reason to
suspect  that  A  is  true”.  By  deduction  we  trace the  necessary  consequences  of  the
hypothesis. These consequences are experimental predictions from the hypothesis, and
are selected independently of whether or not they are known to be true. The requirement
that the hypothesis be experimental is satisfied by following the pragmatic maxim: only
those hypotheses are admissible which can be put to experimental test. Of course, the
surprising fact which prompted the formation of the hypothesis in the first place (“C” in
the Harvard example) is one of necessary consequences of the hypothesis, for were it not,
the hypothesis could not be said to explain the facts (to say that the surprising fact is one
of the necessary consequences of the hypothesis is to say that its explanatory syllogism is
a valid one). But besides the surprising fact, from the hypothesis several other necessary
consequences can be drawn, and this is necessary if we are to test the hypothesis.
11 The third stage of inquiry consists in the testing of the hypothesis through a testing of
those predictions: 
Having, then, by means of deduction, drawn from a hypothesis predictions as to
what the results of experiment will be, we proceed to test the hypothesis by making
the  experiments  and  comparing  those  predictions  with  the  actual  results  of
experiment. […] [When] we find that prediction after prediction, notwithstanding a
preference for putting the most unlikely ones to the test, is verified by experiment,
whether without modification or with a merely quantitative modification, we begin
to  accord  to  the  hypothesis  a  standing  among  scientific  results.  This  sort  of
inference it is, from experiments testing predictions based on a hypothesis, that is
alone properly entitled to be called induction. (EP2: 96-7; original emphasis)
12 The  operation  of  testing  a  hypothesis  by  experiment  is  induction.  It  consists  in
considering the predictions from the hypothesis, remarking what conditions should be
satisfied in order for those predictions to be fulfilled,  causing those conditions to be
satisfied by experiment, and noting the result of the experiment. If the predictions are
fulfilled, the hypothesis is inductively given a certain confidence. As Peirce remarks, in a
1901 article on “Hume on Miracles,” “it  is  not the fact  predicted that in any degree
necessitates the truth of the hypothesis or even renders it probable. It is the fact that it
has been predicted successfully and that it is a haphazard specimen of all the predictions
which might be based on the hypothesis.” (CP 6.527).  The inductive character of  the
procedure of hypothesis verification derives from the fact that the predictions tested are
a sample of all the predictions from the same hypothesis that could be tested. 4 In other
words, the third step of inquiry is the inductive generalization that what is found true of
some predictions would be found true of all of them. 
13 Let us take Peirce’s example of the ex-priest contained in one of the drafts of the Carnegie
Application of  1902 (RL 75)  in order to illustrate the three-stages process of  inquiry:
“Suppose, then, that, being seated in a street car, I remark a man opposite to me whose
appearance and behavior unite characters which I am surprised to find together in the
same  person.”  (RL  75:  163-4).  A  certain  surprising  combination  of  characters,  say
characters c1, … cn, are found in the man sitting in front of Peirce in the car. In order to
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reduce to some order this surprising fact (the occurrence of of c1, … cn), i.e., in order to
explain them, he makes the hypothesis that the man is an ex-priest. The reasoning by
which he form this hypothesis is abduction, and has the following form:
This man possesses the characters c1, … cn.
If he were an ex-priest, he would possess the characters c1, … cn.
Therefore, there is reason to suspect that he is an ex-priest.
14 In order to test this hypothesis, Peirce has to draw from it predictions that can be tested
empirically, at least in principle. Thus two further steps follow abduction in the process
of scientific inquiry. The second step is deduction, and consists in drawing predictions
(which are necessary, or deductive, consequences) from the hypothesis. For example, if
the man is a priest, he should be tonsured: 
This man is an ex-priest.
Ex-priest are tonsured.
Therefore, this man is tonsured.
15 This is deduction, and by deduction predictions are made. The prediction that the man
will be found to be tonsured, which is a sample of all the necessary consequences of the
hypothesis, has now to be put to test by induction. To test the prediction Peirce has to
make an experiment: “I say something to him calculated to make him take off his hat. He
does so, and I find that he is indeed tonsured.” (Ibid.). Peirce can thus conclude that the
man is an ex-priest on the basis of the induction that as this prediction is verified so must
all the predictions drawn from the same hypothesis. In other words, the third step of
inquiry  is  the  inductive  generalization  that  what  is  found  true  of  a  sample  of  the
predictions  will  be  found  true  of  all  of  them.  As  Peirce  writes  in the  Minute  Logic,
“induction is an argument which starts out from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous
abduction, and from virtual predictions, drawn by deduction, of the results of possible
experiments,  concludes  that  the  hypothesis  is  true,  in  the  measure  in  which  these
predictions are verified” (CP 2.96). 
16 In Peirce’s mature view of the logic of scientific inquiry, the three forms of inference are
not  merely  three  distinct  modes  of  reasoning each characterized by its  own leading
principle; also, each belongs to a different stage of scientific inquiry. As he would later
write, “There are three kinds of reasoning based upon as many utterly distinct purposes
and principles. They are severally used in the three logical stages of research.” (R 756: 1 c.
1906). To signalize their double nature (both stages and kinds) in his later writings Peirce
prefers to speak of “grades” (R 843, 1908), or even “orders” (R 752, 1914), rather than
simply of “kinds” of reasoning.
17 We make abductions in order to explain surprising facts, but the “abductive moment” is
only the first part of inquiry: “Retroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must
be tested.” (CP 6.470). Abduction is for the sake of verification. Its conclusion does not say
“A is true,” but “there is reason to suspect that A is true,” that is, “it is worth inquiring
whether A is true.” So Peirce writes to Lady Welby in 1905:
[The] “interrogative mood” does not mean the mere idle entertainment of an idea.
It means that it will be wise to go to some expense, dependent upon the advantage
that  would accrue from knowing that  Any/Some S  is M,  provided that  expense
would render it safe to act on that assumption supposing it to be true. This is the
kind of reasoning called reasoning from consequent to antecedent. […] Instead of
“interrogatory,”  the  mood  of  the  conclusion  might  more  accurately  be  called
“investigand,” and be expressed as follows: It is to be inquired whether A is not
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true. The reasoning might be called “Reasoning from Surprise to Inquiry.” (Peirce
to Welby, July 16, 1905, RL 463; original emphasis)
18 By abduction a hypothesis is suggested. The conclusion of abduction, which contains the
hypothesis,  is  not  in  the  indicative  but  in  the  interrogative  mood:  it  advances  the
hypothesis not as true, nor as a mere idea, but as an idea worth investigating in order to
determine its truth. Abduction is not an isolated form of reasoning, but is embedded
within the larger horizon of inquiry, because a hypothesis is first put forth by abduction,
and  then  verified  by  induction  (through  verification  of  its  observable  deductive
consequences). Scientific inquiry is a “dialectic” between abduction and induction, which
are the beginning and the end of hypothetical thinking, and which are connected by the
gateway of deduction.5
 
2. Brunellus and Other Horses
19 According to Eco’s analysis in “Horns,” Zadig infers the features of the horse that the
royal  officials  are seeking through imprints,  symptoms and clues.6 Here is  Zadig’s  own
explanation:
With respect to the horse of the king of kings, you must know that as I was walking
along the roads in that same wood, I perceived the marks of a horse’s shoes, all at
equal distances. “There,” I said to myself, “went a horse with a faultless gallop.”
The dust upon the trees, where the width of the road was not more than seven feet,
was here and there rubbed off on both sides, three feet and a half away from the
middle of the road. “This horse,” said I, “has a tail three feet and a half long, which,
by its movements to right and left, has whisked away the dust.” I saw, where the
trees formed a canopy five feet  above the ground,  leaves lately fallen from the
boughs; and I concluded that the horse had touched them, and was therefore five
feet  high.  As to his  bit,  it  must  be of  gold twenty-three carats  fine,  for  he had
rubbed its bosses against a touchstone, the properties of which I had ascertained.
Lastly, I inferred from the marks that his shoes left upon stones of another kind,
that he was shod with silver of eleven pennyweights in quality. (Voltaire 1910: 60)
20 The marks of the horse’s shoes are imprints, but the fact that the imprints are all at equal
distance is a sign (a clue) that the horse has a perfect gallop. The fact that the dust upon
the trees is rubbed off on both sides at a distance of three feet and half from the middle of
the road is a sign (a symptom) that the horse has a tail of that length. The leaves fallen
from the boughs are a sign (a symptom) that the animal is five feet tall. The gold on the
touchstone is a sign (a clue) that the horse has bosses of gold twenty-three carats. And
finally, the silver on the pebbles is a sign (a clue) that the shoes of the horses are shod
with silver of a certain quality. Collectively, these signs form an icon of a horse with
certain characters. The signs themselves are indices (clues, symptoms, and imprints), but
collectively they depict a horse, and are therefore the icon of a horse. According to the
early Peirce, in abduction the premises are an icon of the conclusion. 
21 The king’s official asks Zadig whether he has seen the king’s horse passing that way. As
Eco observes, “Voltaire is not explicit on this point, but let us suppose that Zadig has
turned over in his mind many alternative hypotheses and has definitely chosen the final
one only when he has met the men of the Court looking for a horse” (1983: 213). When the
official  asks Zadig whether he has seen the king’s  horse,  this  becomes for Zadig the
confirmation that his horse hypothesis was correct. Only at that point those signs become
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for him the icon of the king’s horse.  But Zadig does nothing in particular to put his
hypothesis to test.
22 William of Baskerville’s horse abduction is of the same type as Zadig’s. But William’s also
features several further elements which deserve some commentary. While he and Adso
are toiling up the path around the mountain that leads to the abbey, they see an “agitated
band of monks and servants” (NR 22). When one of them, the abbey’s cellarer Remigio of
Varagine, introduces himself to the visitors, William says:
The horse came this way and took the path to the right. He will not get far, because
he will have to stop when he reaches the dungheap. He is too intelligent to plunge
down that precipitous slope […] it is obvious you are hunting for Brunellus,  the
abbot’s favorite horse, fifteen hands, the fastest in your stables, with a dark coat, a
full tail, small round hoofs, but a very steady gait; small head, sharp ears, big eyes.
He went to the right, as I said, but you should hurry, in any case. (NR 23)
23 And here is William’s later explanation to Adso:
At  the  crossroads,  on  the  still-fresh  snow,  a  horse’s  hoofprints  stood  out  very
neatly, heading for the path to our left. Neatly spaced, those marks said that the
hoof was small  and round,  and the gallop quite regular – and so I  deduced the
nature of the horse, and the fact that it was not running wildly like a crazed animal.
At the point where the pines formed a natural roof, some twigs had been freshly
broken off at a height of five feet. One of the blackberry bushes where the animal
must  have  turned  to  take  the  path  to  his 
right,  proudly  switching  his  handsome  tail,  still  held  some  long  black 
horsehairs  in  its  brambles.  You  will  not  say,  finally,  that  you  do  not  know 
that path leads to the dungheap, because as we passed the lower curve we saw the
spill of waste down the sheer cliff below the great east tower, staining the snow;
and from the situation of the crossroads, the path could only lead in that direction.
(NR 24)
24 Unlike Zadig, for whom the officials’ question is the confirmation that the hypothesis that
he had formed upon the basis of indices that collectively form an icon is correct, for
William the fact that the men appear “agitated” is a further sign that contributes to the
formation of the Brunellus hypothesis. The appearance of the “agitated band” is for him a
sign that they are seeking something. The imprints suggest William that a horse had
passed that way, and their orientation is a sign (a clue) that the horse was heading to the
right. The shape of the hoofs is a sign (a clue) of the “nature of the horse,” while the
distance between them is a sign (a clue) that the horse has a perfect gallop. The broken
twigs are a sign (a symptom) that the animal is five feet tall. The color of the hairs that
the horse left on the blackberry bushes is a sign (a symptom) that the horse is black. And
the fact that the cellarer in person is part of the “agitated band” is a sign (a clue) that the
horse is considered to be the finest of the abbey. Just like Zadig, who can infer the royal
horse’s appearance before apprehending that in fact the king’s horse is sought, William
can infer the horse’s appearance before knowing what the men are after.  But unlike
Zadig,  for  whom  the  interrogation  of  the  official  is  the  verification  of  the  horse
hypothesis, William is prepared to offer his Brunellus hypothesis before being addressed
by the monks.
25 However, William’s reasoning differs from Zadig’s under a more fundamental respect.
The presence and the shape of the imprints, the hairs left on the bushes, and the broken
twigs allow him to reconstruct some of the features of the horse. But the description that
he offers to the cellarer cannot be explained only in terms of what he has actually seen.
Hence, Adso’s question: 
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“Yes,”  I  said,  “but  what  about  the  small  head,  the  sharp  ears,  the  big  eyes 
…?” “I am not sure he has those features, but no doubt the monks firmly believe he 
does.  As  Isidore  of  Seville  said,  the  beauty  of  a  horse  requires  ‘that  the  head 
be  small,  siccum  prope  pelle  ossibus  adhaerente,  short  and  pointed  ears,  big 
eyes, flaring nostrils, erect neck, thick mane and tail, round and solid hoofs.’ If the
horse  whose  passing  I  inferred  had  not  really  been  the  finest  of  the 
stables,  stableboys  would  have  been  out  chasing  him,  but  instead,  the  cellarer 
in person had undertaken the search. And a monk who considers a horse excellent,
whatever his natural forms, can only see him as the auctoritates have described 
him, especially if” – and here he smiled slyly in my direction – “the describer is a
learned Benedictine.” (NR 24)
As we noticed, from the observed, surprising fact that the cellarer in person is taking part
in the chase William infers that the horse is thought to be the finest of the abbey. We
could express this piece of abductive inference in the Harvard scheme:
(I) The surprising fact that the cellarer himself is taking part in the chase for the horse is observed. 
But if the horse that has escaped were considered to be the finest of the abbey, the cellarer himself
would take part in the chase. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that the horse is considered to be the finest of the abbey.
26 Now, the conclusion of (I) is in its turn the premise for the further inference, call it (II), that
William makes as to the characters of the horse: from the fact that the horse is the finest
of the abbey (conclusion of I, premise of II) William infers that it should be believed by the
monks to possess the characters (small head, sharp ears, and big eyes) that, according to
the authority of Isidore of Seville, make of a horse a fine horse. What kind of inference is
it and what is its logical form?
27 According to Bondanella, with (II) “William has clearly gone beyond the boundaries of
any empirical investigation – he has begun to make broad hypothetical inferences rather
than to deduce from logical premises […] William has become a semiotician employing a
method that is far closer to the abduction discussed by Peirce or Eco himself than to the
logical  deductions  we  associate  with  real-world  detectives  or  a  host  of  fictional
investigators.” (1997: 108). Bondanella is right that (II) is not the kind of inference usually
employed by detectives. But he is wrong that the inference in question is abductive. For
one thing, some confusion is caused by a terminological distortion. As variously observed
(cf. Sebeok & Sebeok 1983; Truzzi 1983), despite of Sherlock Holmes’s classical exposition
of the “Science of Deduction” in A Study in Scarlet (1887, I, 2), the kind of reasoning that
Conan Doyle’s detective typically employs is abductive, not deductive. As Holmes, William
of Barskerville too speaks of deduction,7 but there is reason to suspect that in this case
Eco is deliberately ignoring the Peircean distinction between deduction and abduction in
order to more effectively suggest the inter-textual parallel with Holmes’ “deductions”
(which are actually abductions). And we have seen that William’s inference from the signs
found on the path to the features of the horse sought by the monks is abductive, not
deductive. Most of William’s inferences are in fact abductive. But (II), as we shall see, is
not. 
28 In  order  to  explain  the  difference  between Zadig’s  and William’s  equine  abductions,
DelFattore has made appeal to the conception of “creative abduction”:
[W]hile  Zadig’s  description of  the  king’s  horse  is  confined to  what  the physical
evidence suggests,  William’s description of  the abbot’s  horse includes a creative
abduction based on his knowledge of how various authorities describe the ideal
horse and on his belief  that monks rely more heavily on authority than on the
evidence of their own senses. Thus William states that the horse has a small head,
Eco and Peirce on Abduction
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
8
large  eyes,  and  pointed  ears  –  not  because  he  has  found  physical  evidence  to
suggest that the horse has these qualities but because he invents a horse based on
what he guesses the monks believe about it. (DelFattore 1988: 131)8
29 It  is  time to introduce Eco’s  typology of  abduction:  (i)  an overcoded abduction is  an
abduction in which the rule which, if true, would render a result (surprising fact) a case
of that rule, is given automatically or semi-automatically; (ii) a undercoded abduction is
one in the which the rule is selected from a set of equiprobable rules available in the
encyclopedia; (iii) a creative abduction is one in which the law must be invented ex novo;
(iv) a meta-abduction is an abduction about first-level abductions (H 206-207). I shall not
be particularly concerned with the first three items of this typology, but I will discuss the
fourth in the next section. Determining whether (II) is an abduction or not is a more basic
problem than determining which kind of abduction it is. 
30 If (II) were a form of abduction, it should explain some surprising fact. Now, what is the
surprising fact concerning the monks’ belief that those horses are beautiful which possess
a small head, sharp ears, and big eyes? That the monks so believe (on good authority) is
not a fact that demands explanation, but the rule that is in William’s possession, which he
applies to something that would be explained by that rule, if the latter were true. As a
rule,  it  is  available  in  William’s  encyclopedia,  and  thus  if  (II)  were  abductive,  the
reasoning in question should rather qualify as undercoded, not creative abduction (contra
DelFattore). Since the rule connects beauty and specific anatomical features, that which is
explained by the rule should consequently be either that Brunellus is a fine horse (in fact,
the finest of the abbey), or that he has certain features. But this latter cannot be the fact
that demands explanation, for it is not something that William could have observed. Nor
is in inferable from what he did observe. What he did observe is that the group includes
the cellarer. From this, we have seen, he infers by (I) that the horse sought must be the
finest of the abbey. This is the fact that falls under the rule. If we attempt to put (II) into a
logical form, the result is the following:
(II) The monks believe that a fine horse must have a small head, sharp ears, and big eyes.
The monks of the abbey believe that Brunellus is a fine horse.
Therefore, the monks believe that Brunellus has a small head, sharp ears, and big eyes.
31 (II) is a clear example of syllogistic or deductive reasoning, as it applies a general rule to a
case in order to obtain the result as conclusion. It may be said in weak sense to “explain”
the case (second premise), in the sense that it makes it plain what that case involves. But
the inference, so reconstructed, is deductive, not abductive (of either kind).
32 Is William performing a piece of deductive reasoning, then? In a sense, he is. But this
piece of deductive reasoning is, precisely as in Peirce’s three-stages model of scientific
inquiry, the gateway between the hypothesis that forms the conclusion of a previous
abduction and the testing of that hypothesis by means of the testing of its deductive
consequences. William is not merely deducing the consequences of an idea arrived at by
means of abduction. He is deducing the consequences of that idea in order to put that
idea to experimental test. Once the necessary consequences of the hypothesis are drawn,
William – just like the Peircean scientist – has to make an experiment to verify that
hypothesis.
33 In  the  case  of  Brunellus,  the  experiment  consists  in  enriching  the  description  of
Brunellus, which he has obtained by abductive reasoning from facts (the observed signs
on the path) with characters which are not abduced from observed facts, but which are
rather deduced from the conclusion of a previous abductive reasoning (conclusion of I).
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In so doing, William pretends to be performing an abductive reasoning from observed
facts,  while  he  is  actually  testing  one  of  the  hypotheses  suggested  by  a  previous
abduction. The “amazement” with which the cellarer and the monks look at William after
he describes Brunellus so accurately is the result of the test. It proves not that Brunellus
really has a small head, sharp ears, and big eyes, but only that the monks so believe. And
in fact William is careful to point out to Adso that the hypothesis to be tested does not
concern the real  horse,  but  only the monks’  idea of  it:  “I  am not sure he has those
features,  but  no  doubt  the  monks  firmly  believe  he 
does.”  By  adding  to  his  description  of  the  horse  characters  that  he  could  not  have
abduced from observed facts, William proves that the hypothesis suggested by abduction
– that the horse is the finest of the abbey – is a correct one. If it were not, the cellarer
could have objected that, though William’s description of Brunellus is correct as far as
color, height, gallop, etc. are concerned, yet it is flawed in respect to size of the head and
eyes and shape of the ears. The fact that the cellarer is “amazed” at William’s accurate
description is the inductive test of the validity of a hypothesis entertained on completely
different  grounds (i.e.,  on the ground that  only the finest  horse of  the abbey would
prompt the cellarer in person to take part on the chase). 
34 The testing of the hypothesis is inductive in the authentic Peircean sense. The characters
that  William  mentions  in  his  description  of  Brunellus  (small  head,  sharp  ears,  big 
eyes) are a sample of all  the characters that Isidore (and, following his authority,  the
monks)  believe  a  fine  horse  should possess  (small  head,  sharp  ears,  big 
eyes, flaring nostrils, erect neck, thick mane and tail, round and solid hoofs). William may
therefore be said to make the inductive generalization that what is found true of the
predictions actually put to test (by including in his description of Brunellus a sample of
the characters available in the encyclopedia) would be found true of all of them. Recall
Peirce’s characterization of induction quoted above: “induction is an argument which
starts  out  from a  hypothesis,  resulting  from a  previous  abduction,  and from virtual
predictions, drawn by deduction, of the results of possible experiments, concludes that
the hypothesis is true, in the measure in which these predictions are verified.” (CP 2.96).
The inductive generalization performed by William consists in starting from a hypothesis
resulting  from  a  previous  abduction  (I),  and  from  virtual  predictions,  drawn  by
deduction, of the results of possible experiments (II), concludes that the hypothesis is
true in the measure in which those predictions are verified (the monks’ assent to the
conclusion of II).
35 “Books [Isidore’s included] are not made to be believed, but to be subjected to inquiry.”
(NR 316). Abduction is for the sake of inductive verification. This is true also of the first,
observation-laden abductions that William makes on the basis of the signs found on the
path. When the monks and the servants reappear at the turn of the path leading the
horse by its halter, William can verify his hypotheses as to the color, height, gallop etc. of
the animal by looking at the animal itself; verification in this case simply consists in the
direct perception of the horse. William is very clear about this point: “my intellect’s hunger
was sated only when I saw the single horse that the monks were leading by the halter.
Only then did I  truly know that my previous reasoning had brought me close to the
truth.” (NR 28). But while he can verify color, height, gallop, etc., he cannot verify the size
of the head and eyes and the shape of the ears of the animal by direct perception, because
that hypothesis does not concern the real features of the real animal, but only what the
monks believe the animal’s features to be. And while the former hypotheses are verified
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by the direct perception of the horse, the latter cannot be so verified, and can only be
verified  by  deducing  predictions  from  it  and  putting  those  predictions  to  test  by
including  them into  the  description  of  the  animal  that  is  offered  to  the  astonished
cellarer. 
36 In the overture of The Name of the Rose, Eco gives us a splendid sketch not simply of the
abductive mode of reasoning, but of the entire, three-fold process of scientific inquiry
that Peirce has theorized in his later writings. In Peircean terms, William’s method is
hypothetical-deductive in the sense that his hypotheses are first suggested by abduction,
then developed by deduction, and finally verified by induction. The Zadig episode can
hardly be said to be modeled on the Peircean, three-fold analysis of inquiry, because in
this episode the only verification is the verification of the horse hypothesis, but nothing
is  deduced from the hypothesis  to  be  subjected to  inductive  verification.  Zadig  does
nothing in particular to verify his horse hypothesis. In this respect, while Zadig’s horse
abduction seems to be fashioned on Peirce’s early analysis of abduction (the data are
signs, and particularly indices that form an icon, of the conclusion), William’s course of
reasoning  is  more  akin  to  Peirce’s  mature  analysis  of  abduction  (an  hypothesis  is
suggested  by  abduction  from  data,  and  is  subsequently  analyzed  by  deduction  and
verified by induction). 
 
3. Meta-Abduction and the “Bottom Question of
Logical Critics”
37 The fact  that  abduction is  the  first  stage  of  inquiry  is  not  yet  an argument  for  the
justification of the abductive mode of reasoning, although it may furnish an insight as to
the elements that may enter into some such argument. 
38 William is, of course, acutely aware of the problem of the justification of abduction. In
looking retrospectively to his fortunate Brunellus hypothesis, he says to Adso:
in  the  case  of  the  horse  Brunellus,  when  I  saw  the  clues  I  guessed  many
complementary and contradictory hypotheses: it could be a runaway horse, it could
be  that  the 
abbot had ridden down the slope on that fine horse, it could be that one horse,
Brunellus,  had left  the tracks in the snow and another horse,  Favellus,  the day
before, the traces of mane in the bush, and the branches could have been broken by
some men. I didn’t know which hypothesis was right until I saw the cellarer and the
servants anxiously searching. Then I understood that the Brunellus hypothesis was
the only right one, and I tried to prove it true, addressing the monks as I did. I won,
but I might also have lost. The others believed me wise because I won, but they
didn’t know the many instances in which I have been foolish because I lost, and
they didn’t know that a few seconds before winning I wasn’t sure I wouldn’t lose.
(NR 305)
39 The Brunellus hypothesis was correct, but it could have been wrong. Abduction is fallible:
“I work on things of nature. And in the investigation we are carrying out, I don’t
want to know who is good or who is wicked, but who was in the scriptorium last
night, who took the eyeglasses, who left traces of a body dragging another body in
the snow, and where Berengar is. These are facts. Afterward I’ll try to connect them
– if it’s possible, for it’s difficult to say what effect is produced by what cause. An
angel’s intervention would suffice to change everything, so it isn’t surprising that
one thing cannot be proved to be the cause of another thing.  Even if  one must
always try, as I am doing.” “Yours is a difficult life,” I said. “But I found Brunellus,”
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William cried, recalling the horse episode of two days before. “Then there is an
order in the world!” I cried, triumphant. “Then there is a bit of order in this poor
head of mine,” William answered. (NR 207)
40 The fact that the conclusion of an abductive inference may be true does not prove that
abduction is valid. Properly speaking, abduction proves nothing. It only offers a coherent
representation of the world (“a bit of order in this poor head of mine”),  without yet
establishing that  the world itself  is  coherent.  In fact,  several  of  the hypotheses  that
William advances in the course of the story will turn out to be wrong. That the Brunellus
hypothesis was correct is not a proof of the validity of the mode of reasoning by which
that  hypothesis  was  reached.  In  order  for  abduction to  be  valid  we  should  need  to
postulate an order in the world; but,  as William confesses at the end of the story, “I
behaved, stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that
there  is  no  order  in  the  universe”  (NR  488).  The  abductive  reasoner  pursues  a
representation of order, but this does not yet mean that the world is in fact as ordered as
it is represented to be.
41 What is the justification of abduction, then? Eco’s theoretical answer to this question is in
“Horns.” After having presented his three kinds of abduction (overcoded, undercoded,
and creative), Eco adds a fourth kind, which he labels “meta-abduction.” Meta-abduction
“consists  in  deciding  as  to  whether  the  possible  universe  outlined  by  our  first-level
abductions is the same as the universe of our experience” (H 207), i.e., whether the “order
in the head” (world as represented) is the same as the “order in the world” (world as is
independently of being represented). Eco explains his notion of meta-abduction through
the  Zadig  example.  Zadig  “does  not  possess  the  scientific  certainty  that  his  textual
hypothesis  is  true:  it  is  only  textually  verisimilar.  Zadig  pronounces,  so  to  speak,  a
teleological judgment. He decides to interpret the data he had assembled as if they were
harmoniously  interrelated.”  (H 213;  original  emphasis).  Zadig  does  not  know that  his
hypothesis (that the king’s horse is such-and-such) is true. He only acts as if it were true.
42 Paolucci (2017a; 2017b) has convincingly argued that Eco’s solution is at bottom Kantian:
the abductive reasoner acts as if the representation of the world yielded by abductive
reasoning  were  isomorphic  to  the  world  itself.  Abductive  reasoning  is  in  this  sense
governed  by  a  regulative,  not  a  constitutive  principle.  A  constitutive  judgment  or
principle is one that determines its object, while a regulative judgment or principle does
not determine its object, but only determines the rule for the determination of the object.
Thus, in mathematics an analogy or proportion is always constitutive,  for once three
terms are given, the fourth is given as well; in philosophy, by contrast, an analogy is
merely regulative: once three terms are given, what is given is not the fourth term, but
only the relation of the three terms to the fourth, that is, what is given is only the rule to
find that  fourth term in experience (A179-180/B222-223).  Thus,  the synthetic  a priori
“mathematical” principles of pure understanding are constitutive, while the synthetic a
priori “dynamical” principles are merely regulative. A constitutive proposition describes
the world. A regulative proposition prescribes what we ought to think about the world
(A509/B537).
43 According  to  Eco,  the  leading  principle  of  abduction,  and  thus  its  justification,  is
regulative, not constitutive. If it were constitutive, any abductive representation of the
world would ipso facto be true, i.e., would perfectly correspond to the world. But nothing
guarantees that the world is  isomorphic to the representation of  it:  in abduction we
merely act  as  if our representations were isomorphic to the world,  without  however
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thereby asserting that the world is in fact as it is represented to be. This is the meta-
abduction that underlies every possible abduction: we reason abductively as if abduction
were a valid form of reasoning, and thus we proceed upon the meta-abduction that the
world  represented  in  our  first-level  abductions  is  the  same  as  the  world  of  our
experience.
44 The notion of meta-abduction is Eco’s Kantian solution to the problem of the justification
of abduction. As such, it precisely corresponds to Peirce’s, as we shall now see. According
to the late Peirce, the question of the justification of the several kinds of reasoning is a
problem of “logical critics” (the central, and fundamental, department of logic, which
follows speculative grammar and precedes methodeutic, cf. R 478, 1903). The justification
of deduction is not, properly speaking, a problem of logic (RL 75: 12-3, 1902). All deductive
reasoning  is  mathematical  reasoning,  and  mathematical  reasoning  for  Peirce  is  not
subject to logic (CP 2.191). A piece of deductive reasoning is mathematically valid before
being  logically  valid.  Deductive  logic  depends  on  mathematics;  it  is  in  fact  applied
mathematics, i.e., mathematics applied to logic (CP 4.228, 4.233, 4.240, 1902). Deduction is
valid because it is mathematically valid.
45 Induction is  valid because it  is  auto-corrective.  Though any single  induction may go
wrong,  yet  inductive reasoning – reasoning from a sample to the whole – pursues a
method whose continual and repeated application will yield correct representations more
often than wrong, and therefore will in the long run approximate complete truth. For
Peirce that is real which is represented in a true representation, and truth depends not
on this or that representation but only on the representation that will be yielded in the
long run by scientific (i.e., inductive and abductive) investigation, and which is therefore
independent of particular and individual representations. The justification of induction –
as that of abduction, as we shall see – assumes the reality hypothesis, i.e., that there is a
way things are, independent of the representation. But how things are depends on how
we will be led to represent them (if investigation is protracted far enough), because the
real is nothing more than the object of a true representation.9
46 The problem of the justification of abduction is “the bottom question of logical Critic”
(EP2: 443, 1908). Peirce’s solution to the bottom question of logical critics is the following:
The logical  justification of  Retroduction […]  is  as  follows.  In  the  first  place,  we
certainly do thoroughly believe and cannot help so believing, do what we may, that
some reasonings are sound. For we can free ourselves of a belief only by reasoning
ourselves out of it, and to do this is to believe that some reasonings are sound. Now
although  it  is,  of  course,  one  thing  to  believe  a  proposition,  no  matter  how
thoroughly  and  firmly,  and  quite  another  for  the  proposition  to  be  true,  yet
practically for the believer they are one and the same. For if his belief is perfect he
thinks he is sure it is true and between that and his thinking it is true there is no
practical difference. We must and do admit, therefore[,] that some reasonings are
sound. But to say this is to say that some instinct or natural impulse to believe is in
conformity with the real nature of things; and the only question is how far that
conformity extends. This can only be ascertained by sampling; and the process of
sampling  will  consist  in  taking  Retroduction after  Retroduction  and testing  the
truth  of  each  by  as  large  a  sample  of  its  consequences  as  can  conveniently  be
obtained. This justifies Retroduction, which simply puts that process of testing into
practice  for  single  Retroductions;  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  justification  that
cannot be learned from indubitable external observation and equally indubitable
reasoning. (R 637: 13-4, Oct. 1909)
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47 Here,  as in other coeval  writings,10 Peirce maintains that the validity of abduction is
grounded upon the more fundamental abduction, which we may call ur-abduction, that
nature  is  explainable.  Let  us attempt  to  spell  out  the  details  of  his  argument.  The
argument  is  based  upon the  premise  that  some reasoning  is  sound.  This  premise  is
something  that  we  cannot  doubt.  For  we  actually  have  direct  experience  of  sound
inferences, and thus doubting that some reasoning is sound would amount to doubting
something of which we have direct experience. According to Peirce, such a doubt would
only be a feigned doubt. But though it is unscientific and unphilosophical to suppose that
any particular fact will never be doubted, yet “we cannot go behind what we are unable to
doubt” (W3: 14). In logic we must begin with some belief which is not subjected to doubt
(though it may be doubted in the future),  and mere pretense to doubt “can result in
nothing but a show of demonstration of things really taken for granted” (W2: 189; cf. W2:
212). Thus, logic requires that we admit that some reasoning is sound. 
48 But this admission amounts to the admission that, in some cases at least, we truly know
things as they really are. This is nothing more than a hypothesis: the hypothesis that we
truly have some power of knowing things, that we have a power of abduction. In Peirce’s
terms, the hypothesis is that we have “some instinct or natural impulse to believe […] in
conformity  with  the  real  nature  of  things.”  As  another  passage  from  Peirce’s  1908
“Neglected Argument” recites,  “[t]here is  a  reason,  an interpretation,  a  logic,  in  the
course of scientific advance; and this indisputably proves […] that man’s mind must have
been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the
very bed-rock of logical truth.” (EP2: 444). The hypothesis that man has an instinct to
truly represent reality is the fundamental hypothesis of scientific inquiry, “the bed-rock
of logical truth.” 
49 Now,  this  fundamental  hypothesis,  like  every hypothesis,  must  be  put  to  test  to  see
whether and to what extent it is verified. Once the existence of sound reasoning, i.e., of
reasoning by which we truly know reality, is admitted, the only question that remains to
be settled is how far that knowledge extends, i.e., how far the hypothesis can be verified
(“the only question is how far that conformity extends”). Now, as we know from previous
discussion, a question concerning the truth of a hypothesis can only be answered by
induction. Therefore, the extent to which we have a power of truly knowing real things
by abductive reasoning is determined by checking how far our abductions are successful
or have been successful in the past. And since the history of science provides us with
abundant examples of successful abductive inferences, the fundamental abduction or ur-
abduction that we have a power of abduction is verified, at least in some measure, by the
history of  science:  “since  all  modern science depends  ultimately  on this  method,  its
history furnishes such a sample of intelligent hypotheses, that a student of that history
must be blind not to see that man’s mind has a certain power of divining the truth.” (R
638:  14-5).  The history of  science is  as  it  were the ur-induction that  verifies  the ur-
abduction that we have a power of abduction, just like single inductions verify single
abductions (“simply puts that process of testing into practice for single Retroductions”). 
50 For Peirce the justification of abductive reasoning lies in the fundamental hypothesis, or
ur-hypothesis,  that  we have a power of  truly knowing things by means of  abductive
reasoning. As with every hypothesis, this ur-hypothesis must be verified, and is verified
through an argument from the history of science (ur-induction). Abduction is therefore
directly justified through an ur-abduction, which in its turn is verified inductively: the
justification of abduction is for Peirce directly abductive, and indirectly inductive.
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51 It should now be clear to the reader that what I call Peirce’s ur-abduction is precisely
Eco’s  meta-abduction.  As  the  latter  consists  in  the  abduction  that  that  the  world
represented in our first-level abductions is the same as the world of our experience, so
the former consists in the ur-abduction that our abductions are sound. In both cases, the
justification consists in admitting a regulative, not a constitutive principle of reasoning.
As for Eco the abductive reasoner acts as if the representation of the world yielded by
abductive reasoning were isomorphic to the world itself (meta-abduction), so for Peirce
the abductive reasoner acts as if the ur-abduction that we can truly know real things were
a sound one. 
52 According  to  Paolucci,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between Peirce’s  and  Eco’s
theories:  while  for  Peirce  there  is  continuity  (synechism)  between mind and matter,
between thought and world,  for Eco no such continuity is  possible;  for Eco “there is
nothing as the structure of the real that allows us to choose one interpretation rather
than another […] The power of falsehood is not the lume naturale and the constitutive
principle of synechisim is invalidated on a semiotic level.” (Paolucci 2017a: 263; original
emphasis).  For Eco, that which for Peirce is a “constitutive” principle of logic is only
“regulative”:  “although  we  know  that  the  order  of  the  world  does  not  necessarily
correspond to that of thought, we must proceed as if this correspondence existed. [...]
This then is a synechism that is not constitutive (as in Peirce) but only regulative of our
inferences  and  interpretations.”  (2017a:  270-1;  original  emphasis).11 According  to
Paolucci,  it  is  not within the domain of  Eco’s  theory that the constitutive continuity
between representation and world represented is to be found, but only within the distinct
and yet related domain of narrative: “Eco is prepared to allow this synechistic order only
in  those  world-models  constructed  by  ‘narrative’  and  not  in  the  real  world:  novels
contain things that do not exist in the world, that is to say, a certain correspondence
between the conjectures of  interpretation and the world-model.” (2017a:  267;  cf.  also
2017b, ch. 10).12
53 As  far  as  Eco’s  theory  of  abduction  is  concerned,  Paolucci’s  argument  is  certainly
persuasive and revealing. However, I would tend to see the distance between Eco and
Peirce on matters abductive as less pronounced than Paolucci seems to think. The crux of
the matter concerns, as I believe I have shown, not the analysis of abductive reasoning but
the  nature  of  the  philosophical  justification of  it.  If  Peirce’s  solution  to  the  “bottom
question  of  logical  critics”  consisted  in  the stipulation  of  a  constitutive  principle  of
abductive soundness, then Eco’s position would really differ from Peirce’s. But as I have
argued above,  Peirce’s  justification of  abduction is  directly abductive (and,  therefore,
indirectly inductive), for it is directly based on the ur-hypothesis or ur-abduction that our
abductions are sound, and indirectly on the inductive verification of such ur-abduction
through an argument from the history of science (ur-induction). This, far from being an
affirmation of the constitutive nature of abduction’s principle, is rather a clear statement
that that principle is merely regulative. If the validity of abduction were grounded by
Peirce on some form of deductive reasoning, we would be justified in holding that such a
justification would make the principle of abduction constitutive. For in that case, the
world would necessarily (i.e., deductively) be as we would represent it to be. This is not
Peirce’s idea of the justification of abduction. For him abduction is valid because it “is the
result of a method that must lead to the truth if […] it is possible to attain the truth.
Namely we must assume the human mind has a power of divining the truth, since if not it
is hopeless even [to reason].” (R 276: 39, 1910). We must “assume” that reality can truly be
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known by abductive reasoning, that is, we must assume the fundamental hypothesis, or
ur-hypothesis, that our abductions are sound. Just as for Eco, for Peirce although we know
that the order of the world does not necessarily (i.e., deductively) correspond to that of
thought, we must proceed as if (i.e., on the hypothesis that) this correspondence existed.
54 Paolucci rightly emphasizes the fact that for Peirce the existence of an epistemological
isomorphism between the order of  representations and the order of  things is  only a
special case of the metaphysical isomorphism between mind and matter, which Peirce
had illustrated in the 1890-1892 Monist “metaphysical project” (W8: 84-205) in the context
of  an  exposition  of  his  “synechistic  metaphysics.”  Now,  synechism  is  for  Peirce  a
regulative, not a constitutive, principle of logic: “a regulative principle of logic requires us
to hold each thing as continuous until it is proved to be discontinuous” (R 398: 11, 1894,
emphasis added); “Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is
a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained”
(CP 6.173,  1902,  emphasis added).  Hypotheses are fit  to be entertained which involve
continuity  rather  than  discontinuity  (CP  6.169),  and  therefore  since  “the  synechist
maintains that the only possible justification for so much as entertaining a hypothesis is
that it affords an explanation of the phenomena” (CP 6.171), the fact that many of our
abductions have been successful has to be explained by the synechistic hypothesis that
world and thought are continuous with each other. But this synechistic hypothesis is,
indeed, a hypothesis, not a fact: it does not make world and thought continuous with each
other, but prescribes how to proceed in our scientific investigations: we must proceed on
the assumption that things are continuous rather than discontinuous, that world and
thought are continuous with each other, and thus that our thoughts can really grasp how
the world really is.13
55 He is most clear about this in a draft of the third Lowell Lecture of 1903:
Kant  has  a  famous  distinction  between  constitutive principles  and  regulative
principles. A constitutive principle express[es] what is so, whatever that may mean.
A regulative principle expresses how you must think about a matter in order to
attain your purposes, whether it be so, or not. For example, in a hand of whist,
when only three rounds remain to be played and you have the lead, you must think
of the cards as lying so that it will be possible for you to win the odd trick, although
you have no evidence that it is so. (R 462: 40, 1903; original emphasis)
56 In any game of cards there is an element of abduction. Namely, the player has to make the
hypothesis that a certain configuration of cards is in the other players’ hands or covered
on the table. The player does not know what the configuration of the cards is, but must
play as if that configuration were known. Abduction is grounded on a regulative principle
of logic.
57 If Peirce’s synechism were an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine, for example
the doctrine that mind and matter are continuous with one another, then we would be
justified  to  hold  that  Peirce’s  justification  of  abductive  reasoning  amounts  to  a
constitutive form of synechism. But Peirce is very clear that his synechism is a regulative,
not a constitutive, principle of logic, which merely prescribes to act as if matter and mind
were  continuous  with  one  another,  and  therefore,  in  abductive  reasoning,  as  if our
abductions were sound. 
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NOTES
1. In its turn, the model of the horse episode in Zadig was the ancient oriental tale of three
brothers  who “abduce”  the  exterior  aspect  of  a  camel  without  having  seen it.  The  tale  was
included in the XVIth century collection Peregrinaggio  di  tre  giovani  figliuoli  del  re  di  Serendippo
(Venice 1557, translated from Persian into Italian by Christopher the Armenian); see Ginzburg
(1983: 124-6).
2. On Peirce’s early, semiotically-oriented analysis of abduction see Bellucci (2017, ch. 1).
3. See Fann (1970: 28). On the difference between Peirce’s early and late theory of abduction see
Paolucci (2010: 155-60); on the late theory see Kruijff 2005. 
4. Cf. Reilly (1970: 62).
5. Cf.  Niiniluoto,  “the  conclusion  of  abduction  states  that  there  are  reasons  for  pursuing  a
hypothesis […] or finding a hypothesis testworth” (1999: S441). On the “interrogative” model of
abduction  see  Pietarinen  &  Ma  2016.  It  has  to  be  observed  that  the  sequence  abduction-
deduction-induction  reflects  the  categorial  sequence  firstness-secondness-thirdness.  This
ordering may have been influenced by the principle of categorial subdivisibility, according to
which in any triadic subdivision into firsts, seconds, and thirds, there is one first, two seconds,
and three  thirds.  Deduction,  being  second,  has  two sub-types  (probable  and necessary),  and
induction, being third, has three (crude, qualitative, quantitative). Thus he writes in the Logic
Notebook:  “If  my present view,  held for four or five years,  is  right that  Abduction Deduction
Induction  [are]  Primarian,  Secundarian,  and  Tertian,  then  there  ought  to  be  two  types  of
Deduction & three of Induction.” (R 339: 196r, 1901). However, the 1902 ordering corresponds to
neither the 1867 ordering – in which induction was indexical and thus connected with the second
category, while deduction was symbolic and thus connected with the third – nor to Peirce’s later
semiotic  taxonomies  –  in  which  again  induction  is  connected  with  the  second category  and
deduction  with  the  third;  cf.  R  339:  285r  (1906).  On  Peirce’s  oscillations  as  regards  the
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correspondence between the kinds of reasoning and the categories see Bellucci (2017: 206-11,
319-20). 
6. In  the  Trattato,  in  the  context  of  his  theory  of  sign  production,  Eco  considers  imprints,
symptoms, and clues as signs produced by means of “recognition”: “In order to be considered as
the functive of a sign-function the object or event must be considered as if it had been produced
by ostension, replica or invention and correlated by a given kind of type/token-ratio.” (T § 3.6.2;
original emphasis). In symptoms and clues the type/token-ratio is facilis (the expression-token is
accorded to an expression-type according to a code), while in imprints the ratio is difficilis (the
expression-token is directly accorded to its content, either because no expression-type exists or
because the expression type is identical with content-type, cf. T § 3.4.9). In “Horns” this typology
is used to explicate Zadig’s inferential moves.
7. Cf. “An hour ago I could expect all horses, but not because of the vastness of my intellect, but
because of the paucity of my deduction,” NR 28 (emphasis added); cf. also NR 96, 209, 354. 
8. See also Cohen (1988: 67), in the same volume.
9. The best work on Peirce’s theory of induction remains Goudge 1940.
10. Cf. the following passage: “This kind of reasoning [abduction] is justified by two propositions
taken together. One is that man’s mind which is a natural product formed under the influences
which have developed Nature (here understood as including all that is artificial,) has a natural
tendency to think as Nature tends to be. This must be so if man is ever to attain any truth not
directly given in perception; and that he is to attain some such truth he cannot consistently, nor
at  all,  deny.  The  other  proposition  is  that  no  other  process  of  deriving  one  judgment  from
another can ever give any substantial addition to his knowledge; so that, if he is to reason at all,
we must assume that this kind of reasoning succeeds often enough to make it worth while; since
it certainly is not worth while to leave off reasoning altogether.” (R 876: 3); cf. also R 905 (1908); R
841-3 (1908); R 328 (n. d.).
11. Although the name of the detective hero of The Name of the Rose (William of Baskerville) is a
clear reference to the princeps nominalium (William of Ockham), it would be improper to ascribe
to Eco a  form of  nominalism on the basis  of  his  theory of  the justification of  abduction.  As
Paolucci  has  persuasively  argued,  Eco  was  by  no  means  a  nominalist,  but  a  realist  and  a
pragmatist of the Peircean stripe: the Latin sentence that closes The Name of the Rose (“stat rosa
pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus”) should not be taken as a profession of nominalism on
Eco’s part, but as Adso’s puzzlement about the sense of the story that he has just narrated; see
Paolucci (2017b: 156-9). 
12. One  is  tempted  to  see  a  connection  between  Eco’s  idea  of  a  “narrative  consistency”  of
abductive reasoning and his semiotic theory of possible worlds. See LF, ch. 8.
13. It may be objected that Peirce’s doctrine of “objective idealism,” namely “that matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (CP 6.25), seems to imply that synechism is a
constitutive and not a regulative principle. But Peirce is equally clear that this doctrine has the
status of a hypothesis. Thus in a 1890 “Sketch a New Philosophy” he writes: “The only possible
way of explaining the connection of body and soul is to make matter effete mind, or mind which
has  become thoroughly  under  the  dominion of  habit,  till  consciousness  and spontaneity  are
almost  extinct.”  (W8:  22).  The  doctrine  of  objective  idealism  is  an  explanation,  i.e.  the
explanation of why matter and mind, world and thought, are as connected as they appear to be.
Qua explanation, this doctrine is a hypothesis, for the only manner of explaining anything is by
means  of  abductive  reasoning.  And  qua hypothesis,  this  doctrine  constitutes  a  regulative
principle. On Peirce’s “objective idealism” see Tiercelin 1998 and Short 2010.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper argues that Umberto Eco had a sophisticated theory of abductive reasoning and that
this theory is fundamentally akin to Peirce’s both in the analysis and in the justification of this
kind of reasoning. The first section expounds the essentials of Peirce’s theory of abduction, and
explains how Peirce moved from seeing abduction as a kind of reasoning to seeing it as a stage of
the larger process of inquiry. The second section deals with one of Eco’s paradigmatic examples
of  abduction,  i.e.,  William  of  Baskerville’s  abduction  concerning  the  horse  Brunellus  in  the
overture  of  The  Name of  the  Rose,  and shows that,  just  like  in  Peirce’s  three-stages  model  of
inquiry, William’s abductions are verified by means of deduction and induction. The third section
examines the problem of the justification of abductive reasoning, and argues that both Peirce
and  Eco  solved  this  problem  through  the  idea  that  the  justification  of  abduction  is  itself
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